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This paper provides new empirical evidence on and theoretical support for the
close link between oil prices and aggregate macroeconomic performance in the 1970s.
Although this link has been well documented in the empirical literature and is fur-
ther conﬁrmed in this paper, standard economic models are not able to replicate this
link when actual oil prices are used to simulate the models. In particular, standard
models cannot explain the depth of the recession in 1974-75 and the strong revival
in 1976-78 based on the oil price movements in that period. This paper argues
that a missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism from standard models may hold
the key. This multiplier-accelerator mechanism not only exacerbated the impact of
the oil shocks in 1973-74 but also helped create the temporary recovery in 1976-78.
This paper derives the missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism from externalities
in general equilibrium. Our calibrated model can explain both the recession in
1974-75 and the revival in 1976-78.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large body of empirical literature has suggested that oil price shocks have an im-
portant eﬀect on economic activity. Rasche and Tatom (1981), Hamilton (1983, 1985,
1996, 2003), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Santini (1985), Gisser and Goodwin (1986),
Loungani (1986), Tatom (1988), Mork (1989), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), and many
others, for example, have convincingly argued that oil prices were both signiﬁcant deter-
minants of U.S. economic activity and exogenous to it in the post-war period.1 However,
despite 30 years of research since the ﬁrst major post-war oil crises in 1973-74, exactly
how a sharp rise in oil price causes a severe economic recession still remains an open
question. Imported oil as an input for the entire U.S. economy accounted for roughly
one percent of the total production cost in the early 1970s. Based on this cost share, and
assuming constant returns to scale, even a 100% increase in the price of oil can trans-
late only to approximately a one percent decrease in output, notwithstanding the likely
counter eﬀects from factor substitutions. Yet the actual decline in output following the
1973 oil crises, that caused a roughly 80 percent increase in the price of imported oil,
was about seven to eight percent from its peak. A strong multiplier is clearly missing
in standard models.
Standard economic theory not only substantially under-predicts the contraction of
output following the oil shocks in 1973-74, but also fails to explain the revival of the
U.S. economy starting in the middle of 1975 despite the continuing rise in oil price level
in that period. Standard theory predicts an immediate permanent drop in output after
a permanent increase in oil prices, while empirical studies show that output undergoes
a U-shaped transitional path after a permanent oil shock.2 For example, real GDP
dropped by only 2 percent on impact in 1974 and the contraction continued for nearly
5 more quarters until 1975. Also, despite oil prices remaining high and continuing to
rise throughout the late 1970s, the U.S. economy started to recover in the middle of
1975, and by the end of 1977 real GDP was already back to its potential trend level.3
Such a dramatic recovery after a nearly permanent oil price increase is not predicted by
standard general equilibrium models.
Figure 1 illustrates these multiplier-accelerator eﬀects after the oil shocks in late
1973. In the top panel, the dashed line represents the log price of imported oil, and
the solid line represents percentage changes of the oil price. In the middle panel, the
dashed line is ﬂuctuations in GDP relative to its trend (deﬁned by the HP ﬁlter). In the
4th quarter of 1973 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1974, when the oil price increased sharply
(nearly doubled), real GDP dropped by only two percent, consistent with the prediction
of a standard economic model. However, the contraction continued during the entire
year of 1974. A trough was not reached until 5 quarters later in early 1975, by then
1This is especially true before the mid-1980s. Also see the references in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996).
2Empirical tests show that post-war oil prices follow a random walk. This is especially true prior to
the early 1980s. This suggests that oil price changes are permanent for the period we study.
3During this period, no major counter-oil shocks were observed. If anything, a second major wave
of oil price increases, almost as severe as the ﬁrst one, was forthcoming in the late 1970s. Hence, the
revival in 1976-78 cannot be attributed to anticipation of forthcoming good shocks either.
2real GDP had declined more than seven percent from its pre-shock level. Also notice
the revival in 1975. Within 3 years, the U.S. economy was back to its pre-shock level
again by the 4th quarter of 1978, despite the oil prices remaining high and continuing
to rise throughout that period.
Figure 1. Oil Price and Economic Activity.
Another striking aspect of the 1974-75 recession is that ﬁxed investment suﬀered
the severest hit both absolutely and relative to output. Based on HP-ﬁltered data (the
bottom panel in Figure 1), the fall in investment during an average recession prior to
the 1973 oil shock was about 20% from a peak to a trough. During 1974-75, however,
3investment fell by more than 35% from its peak. Furthermore, the standard deviation of
investment is about 4.4 times that of output prior to the 1973 oil shock. This volatility
ratio increased to 7.1 during the 1973 oil shock period. In contrast, the ratio of standard
deviation of non-durable goods consumption to GDP was about 0.54 prior to the 1973
oil shock, and became 0.31 during the oil shock period.
Thus, there are several major puzzles associated with the 1975 recession following
the oil shock in 1973-74:
1. Why was the recession so deep, much deeper than predicted by standard models?
2. Why was the trough of the recession delayed for 4-6 quarters?
3. Why was there a strong recovery in economic activity in 1976-78 despite oil prices
remaining high and continuing to rise during that entire period?
4. Why did investment suﬀer the severest hit during that period compared to other
components of GDP?
The ﬁrst puzzle has already drawn a substantial amount of attention. But the last
three puzzles have rarely been emphasized in the theoretical literature. Hamilton and
Herrera (2004) also stress that explaining the delay of the eﬀects of oil price shocks is an
important challenge for theory, “(...) the greatest eﬀects of an oil shock do not appear
until three or four quarters after the shock. Investigating the cause of this delay would
seem to be an important topic for research” (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004, p. 281).
Kim and Loungani (1992) show that a standard model is not able to account for
more than 16—35 percent of the reduction in output during the oil crises. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996) argue that monopolist competition is responsible for amplifying the
impact of the oil shock. Finn (2000) argues that perfect competition can also account
for the depth of the recession if ﬁrms’ capacity utilization rate is allowed to vary in
response to the oil shock. Neither of these factors, however, are able to explain the
accelerator eﬀect of the oil shock: the greatest eﬀects of the oil shock do not appear
until several quarters after the shock, and a strong recovery is observed within a couple
of years despite oil prices remaining high. If actual oil prices are used in simulating a
theoretical model, then following the sharp increase in oil prices in 1973-74, both Finn
and Rotemberg and Woodford’s models predict an immediate recession that will last
throughout the entire 1970s without recovery. Such a prediction contradicts what we
see in ﬁgure 1.4
Adjustment costs could be responsible for the delay of the recession. However, since
adjustment costs work against the multiplier eﬀect of monopolistic competition and
capacity utilization, explanations of the gradual contraction based on the adjustment-
cost story requires a much stronger multiplier than that oﬀered by Finn and Rotemberg
and Woodford.5
There are several possible explanations for the economic recovery during 1976-78.
First, factor substitutions and obsolescence of energy intensive technologies after the oil
shocks may explain the full recovery of the U.S. economy after 1975. While plausible, no
rigorous models have been developed to address this possibility. To our knowledge, the
only exception is Wei (2003). But Wei’s analysis still implies that a permanent rise in
4The recovery in 1976-78 is not an artifact of the HP ﬁlter. In what follows we will document the
recovery more carefully using non-detrended data.
5Rotemberg and Woodford argue forcefully that sticky prices are unlikely the key. Herrera argues
that inventory accumulation may be responsible for the delay.
4oil prices should cause a permanent decrease in GDP on impact despite the possibility
of new investment in energy saving machines in her model. In addition, if the U.S.
economy had already switched to energy saving technologies by the end of 1975, which
made the recovery possible, then it is puzzling to see another similar deep recession in
1982 following the second major oil price shock in 1979-1980. Second, there may have
been other positive, counter-oil shocks in 1975-77 to pull the U.S. economy out of the
recession. No strong empirical evidence exists, however, to show large enough positive
macroeconomic shocks hitting the economy during 1975-78.6 Thirdly, some economists
have blamed contractional monetary policy conducted in 1974 for the deep recession in
1974-75 (see, for example, Bernanke et al. 1997, and Barsky and Kilian 2001). This
theory, however, cannot explain the full rebound of the economy in 1978 (starting in
late 1975). No realistic monetary policy could have generated enough output growth
to lead the U.S. economy into a full recovery (see Hamilton and Herrera, 2004). This
notwithstanding, a credible monetary view requires a workable monetary model and
a quantitative simulation of the model using the actual money growth series to show
that monetary policies conducted during that period were indeed responsible for the
recession in the mid-1970s and the recovery in the last half of the 1970s. To the best of
our knowledge, no such quantitative exercises have been carried out in the literature.7
In this paper, we provide further empirical evidence regarding the importance of oil
shocks. We document that the oil shocks in 1973 were indeed the chief cause of the
recession in 1974-75. In particular, we document that after a permanent increase in
oil prices in 1973, the U.S. economy underwent a U-shaped transitional dynamic phase
(particularly in aggregate investment), revealing a strong multiplier-accelerator mecha-
nism. Based on this, we propose a model to explain the multiplier-accelerator eﬀect of
oil shocks on the U.S. economy in the 1970s. To account for the gradual contraction in
1974-75, we do not rely on contractionary or miss-managed monetary policy, which we
think is still open for debate and requires empirical support. To explain the recovery
in 1976-78, we do not rely on the quick obsolescence of energy intensive technologies,
which we think may take place in a period lasting much longer than 3-5 years due to the
high costs involved in developing alternative forms of energy, nor on some unobservable
good shocks hitting the U.S. economy in 1975. Our explanation builds on the insights
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Finn (2000) and is closely related to the sug-
gestion of Hamilton (1988a, 1988b and 2003). According to Hamilton, the oil crises in
1973-1974 aﬀected the aggregate economy mainly by depressing aggregate demand, such
as consumption and investment. In this paper we focus on investment demand. One
possible way to model such a demand-side eﬀect on investment is to allow for external-
ities among ﬁrms. Due to externalities among ﬁrms, the strength of aggregate demand
facing an intermediate goods producer is a function of the production level of other
6We support this statement in Section 2 by decomposing output into movements caused by non-oil
shocks (such as technology shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and monetary shocks) and by oil shocks.
We show that non-oil shocks played little role in reviving the economy in that period.
7Leduc and Sill (2004) can be considered a ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sd i r e c t i o n .H o w ever, their analysis falls
short in addressing our questions because they did not seek to answer whether historical monetary
shocks or oil shocks are responsible for generating the historical time series properties of the recession
in the mid-1970s. Instead, they calibrate the parameters of their model, such as the cost share of oil
in output (or the steady state relative price of oil), so that the depth of the average recession between
1970:2 and 2000:4 is automatically matched.
5ﬁrms. Thus, when the oil crises hit the U.S. economy, contractions in economic activity
at each ﬁrm reinforce each other via the externalities, giving rise to a strong multiplier
eﬀect. The same force of interdependence and reinforcement among ﬁrms’ production
decisions also cause the economy to over-shoot when converging to the steady state,
resulting in cyclical ﬂuctuations. Such a cyclical propagation mechanism is responsible
for the temporary revival of the U.S. economy in 1976-78.
Like Finn, we allow for variable capacity utilization in our model. This helps to
bring the degree of increasing returns to scale required for generating the accelerator
eﬀect in our model to a minimal and empirically plausible level. Since our model can be
represented in two equivalent forms, one featuring perfect competition with aggregate
production externalities and another featuring monopolistic competition with private
increasing returns to scale, our model is also related to Rotemberg and Woodford. We
show that the recession in 1974-75 and the recovery in 1976-78 can be fully rationalized
by the oil price increase in 1973-74 alone, without the need to resort to other unobserved
shocks in that period. This prediction is consistent with our VAR analysis of the impact
of oil shocks on the U.S. economy in that period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst document in Section 2 the
multiplier-accelerator eﬀect of oil shocks in the U.S. economy. Our empirical results
show, consistent with the existing empirical literature (e.g., Hamilton 1983), that the
oil shocks in 1973-74 were largely responsible for the recession in 1974-1975 and the
revival in 1976-78. We then show in Section 3 that a general equilibrium model with
demand externalities is consistent with historical fact. Section 4 concludes the paper
with remarks on further research.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section documents that the sharp increase in oil prices during the 1973 OPEC
embargo is primarily responsible for the deep recession in the U.S. economy in 1974-
1975. Most importantly, we show that the contraction of GDP driven by exogenous oil
price shocks undergoes a U-shaped transition period of gradual contraction and recovery,
revealing a typical multiplier-accelerator dynamic phenomenon. We focus our attention
to the eﬀect of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973.
Although the empirical literature has convincingly argued that post-war movements
in oil prices (at least up to the mid-1980s) were largely exogenous to U.S. economic
activity, we nevertheless take a precautionary position by not excluding the possibility
that U.S. economic activity might also have had potential impact on oil prices through
demand-side eﬀects. Hence, to study the eﬀects of exogenous oil shocks on the U.S.
economy, we ﬁrst decompose movements in the price of imported oil into those driven
by non-domestic (or exogenous) factors and those driven by domestic (or endogenous)
factors. Our methodology for identifying the exogenous factors is based on a long-run
restriction imposed on the eﬀect of an oil shock (e.g., the OPEC decision to raise the
oil price) on the nominal oil price, following the econometric methodology of Blanchard
and Quah (1989). Econometric tests show that post-war oil prices can be best described
as random walks. Hence, we assume that an exogenous oil shock is the innovation that
can have permanent eﬀects on the oil price, and that endogenous factors, which we call
non-oil shocks, can only have transitory eﬀects on the oil price.
6B a s e do nt h i si d e n t i ﬁcation assumption, we can use VAR to decompose movements in
the U.S. economy into those driven by oil shocks and those driven by non-oil shocks. In
order to best capture the eﬀect of non-oil shocks on the U.S. economy, we have included
in our VAR several variables: GDP, consumption, investment, and employment. In a
later section, we also show that our results are robust when monetary policy variables,
such as the interest rate and money supply, are included in the VAR.
Denote ∆p as the percentage change in the oil price and ∆z as the growth rates of the
other non-oil related variables. Assuming that all these variables are jointly stationary,





where x =[ ∆p ∆z]0 and vv0 = Σ. The above presentation can be consistently estimated





where ε is an n×1 vector of structural shocks with an identity covariance matrix. The
ﬁrst structural shock is deﬁned as an “oil shock” and the rest as “non-oil shocks”. The
vector of innovations in the Wold representation, v, and the vector of structural shocks
in the structural representation, ε,a r er e l a t e db y
v = A(0)ε, (3)
where A(0) is an n × n real matrix satisfying Σ = A(0)A(0)0, and the VAR coeﬃcient
matrices in the two diﬀerent representations are related by
A(j)=B(j)A(0). (4)
The “oil shocks” are identiﬁed as innovations that have a permanent eﬀect on the oil
price level and the “non-oil shocks” are identiﬁed as innovations that do not have long-
run eﬀects but may have short-run eﬀects on the oil price through demand-side eﬀects.
Namely, the sequence of matrices A is such that all its upper right-hand entries in the










These restrictions imply that only oil shocks are responsible for any permanent changes
in the oil price. This assumption is consistent with the empirical fact that oil price
movements, especially in the 1970s, are largely exogenous to the U.S. economy (see, e.g.,
Hamilton, 1983). We do not impose prior restrictions on the impact of oil shocks on the
other variables in the VAR, such as the output level, consumption level, investment level,
and employment level. Instead, we allow the data to tell us how those U.S. variables
respond to the oil shocks so identiﬁed.
The data used in our analysis are seasonally adjusted quarterly data starting in
1950:1 and ending in 1978:4, right before the second major oil shock hit the economy in
71979 (which is also a time when the economy was completely recovered to its pre-1973
shock level relative to the trend). The oil price data we use is the spot oil price of
the West Texas Intermediate (available from the St. Louis Fed’s website). The data
for output, consumption, investment, and employment are real GDP, real consumption
for non-durables plus services, real ﬁxed investment, and total non-farm employees,
respectively.8 To obtain the Wold representation (1), we ﬁrst estimate a VAR for xt
and then invert it to obtain a moving average representation. A constant and 4 lags are
included in the VAR. After the matrix A(0) is identiﬁed, we can then decompose each
time series in the vector x into two components: one pertaining to the inﬂuence of the oil
shocks and another pertaining to the inﬂuence of the other non-oil shocks. Since we are
only interested in the joint eﬀects of all of the non-oil shocks, and we are not interested
in further distinguishing the non-oil shocks from each other, how these non-oil shocks are
individually identiﬁed does not matter. What matters are the identiﬁcations imposed
on the non-oil shocks as a group. We therefore apply the Choleski triangularization to
the long-run matrix
P∞
j=0 B(j)A(0) to obtain A(0).9 To uncover the levels of the time
series, we cumulate the decomposed growth rates for each series by adding a constant to
the growth rate (based on the mean growth rate of the data) to induce a linear growth
trend.10
Figure 2. Eﬀects of Non-Oil Shocks on U.S. Economy.
8The data for output, consumption, and investment are taken from the NIPA table for domestic
production, available at the Bureau of Economic Analysis website, http://www.bea.gov/beahome.html.
The data for employment is taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics (series ID is CES0000000001) at
http://www.bls.gov/.
9See Blanchard and Quah (1989) for details.
10Recall that the linear growth trends were removed during the VAR estimation.
8The empirical results are reported in several ﬁgures. First, the identiﬁed eﬀects of
the non-oil shocks on output, consumption, investment, and employment are reported in
Figure 2. We see that ﬂuctuations driven by non-oil shocks track the actual movements
in output, consumption, investment and employment very well between 1950 and the
early 1970s, suggesting that the oil shocks are not the main source of the business cycle
for the entire period prior to 1973.11 In other words, non-oil shocks have been mainly
responsible for all of the business cycles in the U.S. from 1950 until 1973. Starting
from 1974, however, the picture changes dramatically. Non-oil shocks are no longer able
to explain the ﬂuctuations in output, consumption, investment and employment. This
stunning fact can also be seen in Figure 3, which shows the sole eﬀects of the oil shocks
on the U.S. economy. There we see that, in complement to Figure 2, oil shocks have
contributed very little to output ﬂuctuations in the entire sample period prior to the
recession 1974-75. Starting in 1974, however, oil shocks become the dominating force
in output, consumption, investment and employment.
Figure 3. Eﬀects of Oil Shocks on U.S. Economy.
If we follow the existing literature by deﬁning the potential trend of output as
the low frequency movement captured by the HP ﬁlter instead of by a linear trend,
and the business cycle component of output as the high frequency movement around
the HP trend, then the part of the business cycle movements caused by oil shocks
are graphed by the solid lines in Figure 4. Changes in the oil price are represented
11This does not imply that the oil shocks are not related to or responsible for recessions prior to 1973.
Figure 2 simply indicates that at a quantitative level, oil shocks on their own did not play a crucial role
in U.S. economic activity prior to 1973.
9by the dashed lines in the background (the oil price changes are multiplied by 0.1 in
order to highlight the magnitude of the other series), and the actual time series for
output, consumption, investment and employment are represented by the dotted lines.
There we see that although the two major oil price increases in 1951-52 (the Iranian
nationalization) and 1956-57 (the Suez crises) precede the two recessions in 1953-54
and 1958-59 respectively, oil shocks, quantitatively speaking, have played little role
in driving output ﬂuctuations prior to 1973. After the OPEC oil embargo in 1973,
oil prices reached their highest point between the last quarter in 1973 and the ﬁrst
quarter in 1974. Following that, output and consumption started to fall. Investment
and employment lagged consumption and output by one to two quarters, as has been
the case for each post-war business cycle. Driv e nb yt h es h a r pi n c r e a s ei nt h eo i lp r i c e ,
the economy underwent a U-shaped recession throughout the mid and late 1970s. The
trough of the recession was not reached until 1975. After that, the economy started to
recover. By the end of 1977, output, consumption, investment and employment were all
back to or above their pre-shock levels relative to trend. Notice how closely the series
driven by oil shocks track the actual movements in output, consumption, investment
and employment in the 1970s. Based on this empirical evidence, it is fair to conclude
that the deep recession in 1974-1975, as well as the recovery in 1976-78, are almost
entirely due to the oil shocks in 1973-74.
Figure 4. Business Cycle Eﬀects of Oil Shocks.
Thus, the challenge to economic theory is clear: can standard economic models
driven by actual movements in oil prices explain the deep recession in 1974-75 and the
recovery in 1976-78? Ironically, they cannot. Oil shocks have been assigned prominent
10roles in contemporaneous macroeconomic models as examples of supply-side distur-
bances. This includes the modern version of the IS-LM model (see, e.g., Abel and
Bernanke 2001) and the neoclassical business-cycle models (see, e.g., Hamilton 1988a).
Yet, when actual oil prices are used for simulations, standard economic models cannot
explain the deep recession in 1974-75 or the recovery in 1976-78 by the oil increase
in 1973-74. Kim and Loungani (1992), for example, show that standard models can
account for at most 16—35 percent of the reduction in output during the oil crises in
1973-74.
A strong multiplier-accelerator eﬀect is clearly missing in standard models. For this
reason, Barsky and Kilian (2001) argue that the recession in 1974-75 and the subsequent
recovery in 1976-78 may have nothing to do with the oil shocks in 1973-74. Instead,
they argue that the expansionary monetary policies conducted in the early 1971-72 were
responsible for the recession in 1974-75 and the inﬂation in 1975-76. Their argument is
based on a multiplier-accelerator monetary transmission mechanism. This mechanism
generates an economic boom after the expansionary monetary policy in the early 1970s,
and it was this boom that planted the seed for its own destruction in the mid-1970s.
While intriguing, this argument remains a hypothesis unless quantitative simulations
using actual money supply data can be conducted based on their theoretical model, so
as to show that the simulated time series replicate the U.S. data.12
3T h e o r y
3.1 The Model
The model we study is a slightly modiﬁed version of the model of Wen (1998), which is
based on Benhabib and Farmer (1994). There are two types of goods in the economy,
ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods. The ﬁnal good sector is competitive and it uses









where λ ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of factor substitutability among the intermediate
goods (the exact elasticity of substitution is 1
1−λ). Let pi be the relative price of inter-
mediate good i in terms of the ﬁnal good. Proﬁts of a ﬁnal good producer are given
by




The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to one. First order conditions for proﬁt
maximization lead to the following inverse demand functions for intermediate goods,
pi = Y 1−λyλ−1
i . (8)
Assume that each intermediate-good producing ﬁrm i is a monopolist specializing in pro-
ducing good i. The strength of the monopoly power, however, depends on the elasticity
of substitution among the intermediate goods. Notice that the aggregate production
12Also see the skepticism on the monetary view raised by Blanchard (2001) and Blinder (2001).
11level, Y , serves as a demand externality for individual ﬁrms due to complementarity
among the goods they supply to the ﬁnal good sector.




where e ∈ [0,1] denotes the capacity utilization rate, k denotes capital stock, n denotes
labor, and o denotes oil. We assume that oil cannot be domestically produced and
the elasticities satisfy {ao,a k,a n} ∈ [0,1] and (ak + an + ao) ≥ 1, indicating possible
increasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm level. Assuming that ﬁr m sa r ep r i c et a k e r si nt h e
factor markets, the proﬁts of ﬁrm i are then given by
πi = piyi − (r + δi)ki − wni − pooi, (10)
where (r + δi) denotes the user’s cost of capital, w denotes real wage, and po denotes the
real price of imported oil. Notice that factor prices are common to all ﬁrms. Following
Greenwood et al. (1988) and Wen (1998), we assume that ﬁrm i’s capital depreciation





i, θ > 1. (12)
Since intermediate good producers are monopolists facing downward sloping demand
curves, their proﬁt functions can be rewritten as
πi = Y 1−λyλ
i − (r + δi)ki − wni − pooi, (13)
which is concave as long as λ(ak+an+ao) ≤ 1. Proﬁt maximization by each intermediate-
good producing ﬁrm leads to the following ﬁrst order conditions:
eθ−1
















In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ni = n,ki = k,ei = e, δi = δ,o i = o, yi = y = Y,
πi = π, and pi =1 . Also, we have in equilibrium that








π =( 1− λ(ak + an + ao))Y. (19)
In words, perfect competition in the ﬁnal good sector leads to zero proﬁts and imperfect
competition in the intermediate good sector leads to positive proﬁts if λ(ak+an+ao) < 1.














ct + st+1 =( 1+rt)st + wtnt + πt, (21)
where s denotes aggregate savings. Since the aggregate factor payment for oil, poo, goes
to foreigners, it is not included in the consumer’s income. The ﬁrst order conditions for

















In equilibrium, st = kt and factor prices equal marginal products. The ﬁrst order

























ct + kt+1 = kt +
µ





where the variables {o,e} have been substituted out using their respective equilibrium
demand functions.
By similar substitutions using the equilibrium factor demand functions for oil and















where φ is a positive constant and τn ≡ θ
θ−ak > 1a n dτk ≡ θ−1
θ−ak < 1. Equations
(24)-(27) constitute the dynamic system of the model for {kt+1,c t,n t,y t}.






t , we can notice several
things. First, oil price serves as an adverse productivity shock in the model (At = 1
po
t ).
In particular, the larger the cost share of oil, ao, the larger the impact an oil price shock
has on total factor productivity (since γo = aoτn
1−aoτn increases with ao). In addition, the
cost share of oil enhances the output elasticity of labor (since γn = anτn
1−aoτn also increases
with ao). Second, capacity utilization ampliﬁes the impact of oil shocks. Capacity
utilization introduces a new term, τn = θ
θ−ak > 1( s i n c eθ > 1), into the output
elasticities with respect to po and n. Thus, capacity utilization magniﬁes the impact
of an oil shock via two channels: a direct channel via its positive eﬀect on the output
elasticity of total factor productivity (γo) and an indirect channel via its positive eﬀect
on the output elasticity of labor (γn). Third, capacity utilization enhances returns
13to scale if ak + an + ao > 1, because γk + γn ≥ ak + an + ao, with equality only if
ak + an + ao =1 . T h e s ee ﬀects of capacity utilization are discussed in more detail in
Wen (1998) and Finn (2000).13
The model can be solved by log-linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions around the
steady state as in King et al.(1988). It was shown by Wen (1998) and Aguiar-Conraria
and Wen (2004) that with very mild externalities this model possesses multiple dynamic
equilibria around a unique steady state. In particular, equilibrium output and capital
stock in the model follow the following dynamic process (circumﬂex variables denote
















where M is a full-rank coeﬃcient matrix with both eigenvalues lying inside the unit
circle on the complex plane and Θt+1 is a one-step ahead forecasting error of output,
deﬁned as
Θt =ˆ yt − Et−1ˆ yt, (29)
which satisﬁes EtΘt+1 =0f o ra l lt. The forecast error may serve as a source of sunspots
or animal spirits in this model when indeterminacy arises.14 Assuming that the only
major fundamental shocks to the U.S. economy in the 1970s were oil shocks, the forecast
error can then be further decomposed into two orthogonal i.i.d. processes: Θt = ζεt+vt,
where εt ≡ pt − Et−1pt is innovation in the fundamental shocks (i.e., the oil price) and
vt, am e a s u r eo fc o n ﬁdence (i.e., shocks to non-fundamentals) which is often named
sunspots in the literature. Notice that both the coeﬃcient, ζ, and the variance of the
sunspots, σ2
v, are free parameters in the model. If the forecast error is assumed to be
uncorrelated with the fundamentals, then ζ =0 .O t h e r w i s eζ can take any value on the
real line. In this paper, we assume ζ = 0 and there are no sunspots. In other words,
we set Θ = 0. This implies that the indeterminacy of the initial output level, given the
state {ˆ k0,p 0}, is resolved by setting ˆ y0 =0 . 15
3.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model using the following parameter values, which are standard in the
literature for quarterly models: γ = 0 (Hansen’s 1985 indivisible labor),16 β =0 .99
and θ =1 .4 (implying a steady-state rate of capital depreciation equal to ten percent a
year). Since the model can be mapped into a perfectly competitive model with aggregate
externalities, we calibrate the technology parameters, {λ,a k,a n,a o}, according to an
externality version of the model. Denote η as the externality parameter for production,
13Finn’s (2000) model of capacity utilization is slightly diﬀerent from this one, but the mechanisms
are similar.
14See Cass and Shell (1983), Shell (1977, 87), and Benhabib and Farmer (1994) for dicussions on
sunspots-driven ﬂuctuations.
15See Farmer (1999) and Benhabib and Wen (2004) for discussions on calibrating indeterminate
models. Our results are robust to other choices of the initial value of output. For example, we can also
assume that investment or employment have inertia so that ˆ ı0 =0o rˆ n0 = 0, and the results do not
change signiﬁcantly.
16With the indivisible labor assumption, employment in our model, n,d e n o t e st h ef r a c t i o no fl a b o r
force in the economy instead of the fraction of hours devoted to work.
14in a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate version of the production function (9) can






where the aggregate returns to scale are given by 1+η. This model is equivalent to the
monopolistic competition model if λ(1 + η)=1 ,a k = αk(1 + η),a n = αn(1 + η), and
ao =( 1− αk − αn)(1 + η).17 Thus, we can calibrate the output elasticity parameters
in the production function according to each production factor’s cost share in output.
Following the existing literature (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer 1994 and Wen 1998), we
set the labor’s share αn =0 .7. Nordhaus (2002) estimates imported oil’s share in GDP
for the post-war period to be about one percent (with a standard error of 0.67 percent).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996, p. 564-565) also suggest that imported oil account for
about 1.6 percent of GDP. Hence we set oil’s share αo =0 .015 as our benchmark. This
implies capital’s share αk =0 .285. Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) recently re-estimated
the aggregate returns to scale for the U.S. economy. Their robust estimate of returns
to scale is in the range of 1.09 − 1.11. We choose η =0 .108, which is in line with
their estimates. This implies a markup of around 11 percent (1
λ =1+η ≈ 1.11) in the
monopolistic version of our model.
We also need to assume a stochastic process for the oil price in order to compute the
equilibrium decision rules, which are functions of the forecast of future oil prices, Etpt+j.
Hamilton (1983, 1996), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), and
others have argued that oil prices are exogenous to the U.S. economy, at least up to the
mid-1980s. Also, based both on the Dickey Fuller test and on the Augmented Dickey
Fuller test, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root in oil prices for either the
entire post-war sample (1950:1-2003:4) or the sample period we use (1950:1-1978:4). In
particular, when running univariate autoregressions for oil prices with several lags and
a constant, all the coeﬃcients except that for the ﬁrst lag are found to be statistically
insigniﬁcant, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst lag
is unity. We tested for serial correlation in the residuals using the Breusch-Godfrey LM
test of order 4. No evidence of serial correlation was found. Hence the logarithm of oil
price can be reasonably characterized as following a random walk: Etpt+1 = pt,i m p l y i n g
that the best forecast of future oil prices is its current value, and past information is
not helpful for predicting future changes in the oil price. The random walk assumption
is also consistent with our empirical VARs in Section 2.
3.3 Predictions
Before presenting the predictions of our model, we ﬁrst present the predictions of stan-
dard models so as to highlight the importance of the multiplier-accelerator mechanism
missing in standard models. The predictions of a model with constant returns to scale
(η = 0), perfect competition (λ =1 ) ,a n dﬁxed capacity utilization (e = 1) are presented
in Figure 5, where the dashed lines represents U.S. data. It shows that the standard
model cannot generate a recession. The recession in the model is barely observable.
Output contracts only by two percent in the model after a near doubling of the oil price
in 1974, while the actual contraction is about eight percent in the data.
17See Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Benhabib and Wen (2004) for a rigorous proof.
15Fig. 5. Predictions of a Standard RBC Model (solid lines).
Allowing for capacity utilization can greatly magnify the impact of oil shocks. This
can be seen from the predictions of Finn’s (2000) capacity utilization model presented
in Figure 6 (Figure 6.1 zooms in on the period of the 1970s). Figure 6 shows that Finn’s
model is able to match the depth of the 1975 recession in output. This is attributable to
a variable capacity utilization that ampliﬁes the impact of the oil shocks. However, the
model still fails to match the data on several grounds. First, it predicts an immediate
permanent recession after the oil shock in 1973, failing to explain the gradualness of the
recession in 1974-75 and the recovery in 1975-78. Second, the model cannot match the
depth of the recession in investment and employment, and it over-predicts the depth of
the recession in consumption. Furthermore, the model fails to predict the delay of the
recession in employment by several quarters. Among these failures, the failure to match
the U-shaped transitional dynamics of the recession is the most striking.18
18Since Finn (2000) shows that her model and the model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) give
almost identical predictions, we omit replicating Rotemberg and Woodford’s model.
16Fig. 6. Predictions of Finn’s (2000) Capacity Utilization Model.
Fig. 6.1. Predictions of Finn’s Model (zoom in on Fig. 6).
17Figure 7 (Figure 7.1 zooms in on the 1970s period in Figure 7) shows that our model
improves the predictions of the standard models substantially on several grounds. First,
it can predict not only the depth of the 1975 recession in U.S. output, but also the depth
of the recession in investment and employment. Second and most strikingly, the model
is able to predict the U-shaped transitional dynamics seen in the data. For example,
the model predicts that the trough of the recession is delayed by 4-6 quarters after the
oil price increase in late 1973, and that there will be a recovery in 1976-78. However,
the model tends to under-predict the recession in consumption and over-predict the
recession in employment.19 Overall, however, the improvement of the model over the
standard models are signiﬁcant.
Fig. 7. Predictions of Our Model.
19T h i sh a st od ow i t ht h es m o o t h n e s so ft h er e a lw age in the current model (see Wen, 1998, for
explanations). This failure also implies that the current model is not able to match the depth of the
recession in labor’s productivity, which Finn’s (2000) model is able to match.
18Fig. 7.1. Predictions of Our Model (zoom in ﬁg. 7).
The reason for the model’s success lies in a multiplier-accelerator mechanism emerg-
ing under externalities (or monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale).
This mechanism gives rise to dampened cycles as can be seen from the impulse response
functions of the model in Figure 8. The impulse response of GDP, consumption, in-
vestment and employment to a doubling of the oil price in the U.S. data also exhibits
similar dampened cycles as can be seen in Figure 9.20
20These estimated impulse responses of the US economy to an oil shock are computed directly from
the estimated structural representation in Section 2.
19Fig. 8. Impulse Responses to a Doubling of the Oil Price (Model).
Fig. 9. Impulse Responses to a Doubling of the Oil Price (U.S. data).
203.4 Dissecting the Multiplier Eﬀect and the Accelerator Eﬀect















where φ is a positive constant and τn ≡ θ
θ−ak,τk ≡ θ−1
θ−ak. If, on the other hand, we
use the externality version of the model by setting ao = αo(1 + η),a k = αk(1 + η),
















where τn ≡ θ
θ−αk(1+η),τk ≡ θ−1
θ−αk(1+η).
Suppose there are no externalities (η = 0) and there is no variable capacity utilization
(θ = ∞ and τn = τk = 1). Then the output elasticity of the oil price is given by − αo
1−αo,
and the output elasticity of labor is given by αn
1−αo. Based on our calibration of oil’s
share in production (αo =0 .015), the oil elasticity is 0.015 and the labor elasticity
is 0.71, suggesting that a doubling of the oil price (a 100% increase in the oil price)
translates to less than a 1.5% change in output, holding labor constant. Since a higher
oil price decreases labor’s productivity, employment will also decrease, amplifying the
impact of oil price on output. For simplicity, assume that labor decreases by 1%, then
there will be another 0.71% additional change in output. The total output change is
thus about 2.2%.
If capacity utilization is variable, then the oil price elasticity is given by − αoτn
1−αoτn =
−0.019, and the eﬀective labor elasticity is given by αnτn
1−αoτn =0 .9. A doubling of the oil
price then can lead to about a 3% decrease in output under the maintained assumption
that labor decreases by just 1%. Thus the multiplier eﬀect of capacity utilization is
approximately 1.3. This multiplier eﬀect, however, is still not suﬃcient for accounting
for the data, which shows that output dropped by almost eight percent in 1975 from its
peak.21 Notice that these standard models do not have cyclical propagation mechanisms,
hence there is no dynamic multiplier but only a contemporaneous multiplier. That is,
the maximum impact of the oil shock always takes place in the impact period.
If we allow for externalities or increasing returns to scale in the capacity utilization
model, although the size of the contemporaneous (or instantaneous) multiplier does not
change dramatically for small externalities, an accelerator will emerge, giving rise to an
intertemporal (or dynamic) multiplier. Under the intertemporal multiplier, output not
only decreases in the impact period but also continues to decrease over time, leading
to a deeper slump. For example, if η =0 .1, the output elasticity of the oil price
becomes 0.02 and the labor’s elasticity becomes approximately 1.0. Hence, judged by
the instantaneous multiplier, the total change in output is still roughly 3% in the impact
period. But, under the inﬂuence of the intertemporal multiplier (i.e., the accelerator),
21The reason that Finn’s (2000) model has a large enough multiplier to match the depth of the
recession is that she assumes a much larger oil share in the US aggregate production. Her calibration is
equivalent to setting αo =0 .043, implying an output elasticity of the oil price in the order of
αoτn
1−αoτn ≈
6%. This elasticity, combining with a fall in labor, can account for the fall in output.
21output continues to decrease for several quarters before a trough is reached. Based on
our parameter calibration, at the trough, output is about 8% below its initial value (see
Figure 8).
Hence, once externalities are allowed, one of the most striking features of the model
arises: it now exhibits persistent oscillations around the steady state. The cyclical
mechanism arises under externalities because ﬁrms’ production decisions and invest-
ment activities reinforce among each other, causing the aggregate economy to over-
shoot the steady state as the economy converges. Such over-shooting behavior implies
cycles. Consider a permanent increase in the oil price. The rise in oil price increases
the marginal cost of production at the ﬁrm level, hence reducing oil demand as well
as employment and capacity utilization. This causes a contraction in output. Antic-
ipating a lower future productivity of capital, ﬁrms also reduce investment spending,
depressing aggregate demand and leading to a fall in the capital stock. Due to the
force of externalities among ﬁrms, this becomes a cumulative process of contractions.
As the contraction continues, the rising marginal product of capital dictates that the
decrease in output slows down (de-accelerating). The result is that sooner or later the
capital stock and output must stop declining, and capacity utilization and investment
must start to increase to exploit the excessively high marginal product of capital at
a business-cycle trough. But a rise in the investment demand then also triggers out-
put expansion. Thus, the above propagation mechanism reverses itself, leading to a
cumulative process of recovery and expansion.
3.5 Robustness
The above predictions are generated by using the nominal oil price. One may argue
that what matters for the U.S. economy is the movement in the real oil price. For this
reason, we have also simulated our model using the real oil price, deﬁned as the ratio
of the nominal oil price to the GDP deﬂator. The results are almost exactly the same
as those obtained under the nominal oil price. We have also tried to follow the idea
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) by identifying the component in the real oil price
that is due to oil shocks in the nominal oil price. For example, we run a VAR with
ﬁrst diﬀerences in nominal and real oil prices and identify the oil shocks using the same
methodology outlined in Section 2. Then the movements in the real oil price due to
the oil shocks are fed into our theoretical model. The predictions of the model remain
essentially the same.22
We have also conducted robustness analysis on the empirical VAR exercises in Sec-
tion 2. First of all, we have checked that replacing the nominal oil price by the real oil
price in our VAR does not alter our results at all. This is true since real oil prices move
very closely with nominal oil prices in that period. Secondly, Bernanke et al. (1997) and
especially Barsky and Kilian (2001) argue that monetary policy, instead of oil shocks,
could have been responsible for the recession in 1975. Hence we have also re-estimated
our measure of oil shocks and their impact on the U.S. economy in Section 2 by extend-
ing our VAR to include some measures of monetary policy (e.g., the growth rate of the
money supply and the interest rate).23 Our empirical estimates of the impact of the oil
22The results are available from the authors upon request.
23We use the currency component of M1 as our measure of the money supply. The interest rate used
22shocks on the U.S. economy between 1950 and 1978 remain essentially unchanged when
these measures of monetary policy are included in the VAR (see Figure 10).24 Thus, we
a r ea b l et or e - c o n ﬁrm our earlier empirical ﬁndings that non-oil shocks, whether they
be technology shocks, aggregate demand shocks, or monetary policy shocks, as long
as they do not cause permanent changes in the price of imported oil (our identifying
assumption), are not responsible for the recession in 1975 and the subsequent recovery.
Only shocks that caused permanent changes in oil prices — such as the OPEC embargo
in 1973 — are the culprit of the business cycle observed in the 1970s.
Fig. 10. Estimated Eﬀects of Oil Shocks on U.S. Economy in a 7-Variable VAR.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we provide further empirical evidence for the importance of oil shocks in
driving U.S. economic ﬂuctuations. Our results strengthen the previous ﬁndings of the
empirical literature, showing that the oil crises in the early 1970s are the culprit of the
deep recession in the mid-1970s. However, standard models are not able to quantita-
tively account for this oil-driven recession despite the common belief that oil shocks in
the 1970s are responsible for that recession. In fact, it is common for textbooks and the
literature to cite the oil crises in 1973 as a leading example of productivity-shocks that
drive post-war business cycles. We argue that the failure of standard models hinges on
is the 3-month treasury bill rate in the secondary market. The data is available at the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank’s homepage. The VAR includes 4 lags, a constant, and a linear time trend.
24Our results thus conﬁrm the skepticism raised by Blanchard (2001) and Blinder (2001) regarding
the importance of monetary shocks in explaining the recession after the oil shocks in the 1970s.
23a missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism that serves to amplify and propagate the
impact of oil shocks on the U.S. economy. We construct such a multiplier-accelerator
mechanism using a general equilibrium model featuring capacity utilization and exter-
nalities; we show that the mechanism is capable of explaining the important features of
the data.
Our model, however, still has shortcomings. In particular, our model is not able
to fully predict the depth of the recession in consumption and productivity. Possible
remedies include allowing for labor hoarding as in Wen (2004). Due to labor hoarding,
ﬁrms can adjust the utilization rate of labor in addition to that of capital, giving ﬁrms
an extra margin for improving the elasticity of output relative to employment. This can
lead to a more procyclical real wage and possibly to more volatile consumption. Also,
like other models, our model cannot explain the asymmetrical eﬀects of oil shocks. We
hope to address these issues in future research. Another interesting challenge is to si-
multaneously account for the high inﬂation (stagﬂation) in the mid-1970s. This requires
introducing money, and possibly an endogenous monetary policy, into our model. Since
this will inevitably complicate our model substantially, we leave this as a task for future
research.
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